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Trending U. War and Illusions 2. Looking for Illusions 3.
Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions - Semantic Scholar
World War I 4. The Munich Crisis 5.
The Cuban Missile Crisis 6. The Vietnam War 7. Vanity Dies Hard 8.
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The decision to go to war in illustrates all this beautifully, Johnson maintains. The leaders of Germany, Russia, France, Britain and even Turkey all announced that the war would be quick and easy--and that they would win. All the evidence he provides from private sources indicates these leaders believed this in their hearts.
Overconfidence and war : the havoc and glory of positive illusions
And one of the reasons many gave is a hallmark of positive illusions: the moral factor. The superiority of their race, culture etc. As for military commanders, they had carefully prepared plans, and were confident the plans would succeed--as if their foes would simply fall into their hands. Of course, all these leaders were dead wrong.
The Great War proved longer and more destructive than anyone had imagined. Even the one power which did not expect an easy victory--Austro-Hungary--never imagined defeat and its own dissolution. If positive illusions were responsible in part for the enthusiastic decisions to go to war in , what about crises which did not flame into fighting? Johnson takes up two such crises as his next studies by looking at Munich in and the Cuban missile crisis of He argues that confidence levels were lower, and not shared by all parties, in the negotiations in Munich, and during the Cuban Missile crisis.
Beard on Johnson, 'Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions'
Hitler was confident he could bluff his opponents--but not that his armed forces could beat France and Britain. Chamberlain was overly optimistic about Hitler's honesty and ambitions, but these misperceptions faded during the crisis. In , Khrushchev had illusions about his ability to install missiles without the United States either detecting them or reacting firmly, but he had no illusions about the relative military power of the USSR.
Neither he nor Kennedy harbored any illusions about surviving a nuclear war.